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Bartels and May propose an explanation of the difference between practical and
theoretical knowledge in terms of the involvement of non-conceptual and concep-
tual representations, respectively. They thereby want to alleviate a shortcoming of
Stanley’s intellectualist theory of knowledge-how that cannot explain this differ-
ence. In this paper it is argued that an appreciation of the fact that both Stanley
and Bartels and May employ a semantic reading of propositionality makes clear
that their endeavors follow quite different goals. While Stanley gives an analysis
of how we talk about knowledge-how, Bartels and May are interested in underly-
ing cognitive representations. From Stanley’s analysis of knowledge-how, nothing
can be inferred about cognitive representations. The semantic reading of proposi-
tionality is then spelled out with the help of the idea that ascriptions of proposi-
tional  attitudes  are  (like)  measurement  statements.  Some  considerations  from
measurement theory show how propositions can be used to reason about psycho-
logical states without themselves having to play any role in a person’s psycho-
logy.
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1 Introduction
Bartels and May’s paper presents the outlines of
a theory of practical knowledge. The paper con-
sists of a discussion of intellectualist and anti-
intellectualist  approaches  to  knowledge-how,  a
characterization of a range of behavioral partic-
ularities  of  practical  knowledge,  and  the  out-
lines of a theory that attempts to explain these
behavioral  particularities  in  terms  of  involved
underlying mental representations. The discus-
sion is remarkably clear, and the explicit expos-
ition of what is to be explained by a theory of
practical knowledge is a great virtue of the pa-
per. For our purposes here, a discussion of the
initial  characterization  of  practical  knowledge
and its attempted explanation in terms of con-
ceptual  and  non-conceptual  capacities  would
help us assess the import of this paper. To my
valuation,  however,  the discussion also  reveals
some  very  important  features  of  the  relation
between knowledge ascriptions (and, to that ef-
fect,  ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes  in
general) and descriptions of underlying cognit-
ive structures and representations. Most import-
antly,  Bartels  and  May  employ  Stanley’s  se-
mantic reading of propositionality, according to
which the propositionality of some mental state
depends on whether a proposition is mentioned
in the ascription of that state. As a result, ques-
tions concerning cognitive structure and under-
lying representations are largely detached from
considerations concerning ascriptions of proposi-
tional attitudes. I think this is a great advant-
age, because we are not led to read back the re-
lational grammatical structure of ascriptions of
propositional attitudes onto psychological states
themselves.  Here  I  want  to  focus  on  this  se-
mantic  reading  of  propositionality  and  ask
about its effects on the relation between Bartels
and  May’s  proposed  explanation  of  practical
knowledge and Stanley’s theory of  knowledge-
how. The result will be that Stanley and Bartels
and  May  attempt  to  explain  quite  different
things. While Stanley proposes a theory of how
we ascribe knowledge-how to each other, Bartels
and May are interested in underlying cognitive
processes. The semantic reading of proposition-
ality, however, only goes halfway towards disen-
tangling  these  different  endeavors.  A  further
step can be made with the help of the idea that
ascriptions of propositional attitudes are (like)
measurements. I will call this the measurement
view of  ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes.
Considerations  from  measurement  theory  can
then be used to shed further light on the rela-
tion  between ascriptions  of  propositional  atti-
tudes and the underlying cognitive representa-
tions. The result will be that nothing can be in-
ferred about cognitive structure from the struc-
ture  of  ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes
alone. Propositions need not play any role in a
theory of cognition. Nonetheless, there is a clear
sense in which propositional attitudes are real.
They are the measurement-theoretic represent-
atives of behaviorally relevant states. In closing
I  will  note  that,  given  the  close  connection
between concepts and propositions, a semantic
reading of conceptuality might be desirable. For
Bartels and May, this would mean that the dif-
ference between practical and theoretical know-
ledge should not depend on the conceptuality of
the underlying representations. But given their
definition  of  conceptuality,  this  would  merely
require a change in nomenclature.
Before going into the discussion of  a se-
mantic reading of propositionality, of measure-
ment and its bearing on the relation between
Bartels  and  May’s  proposed  explanation  of
practical  knowledge  and  Stanley’s  theory  of
knowledge-how, I will briefly summarize Bartels
and May’s line of argument.
2 The semantic reading of 
propositionality and the explanation of 
practical knowledge
Bartels and May set out to clarify what a the-
ory of knowledge-how should provide and begin
to give the outlines of such a theory. In their
view, a theory of knowledge-how should explain
the difference between practical and theoretical
knowledge, the former being characterized by a
number of distinguishing features. The proposal,
then, is to explain this difference in terms of the
reliance on non-conceptual capacities (or repres-
Glauer, R. (2015). The Semantic Reading of Propositionality and Its Relation to Cognitive-Representational Explanations - A Commentary on 
Andreas Bartels & Mark May. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 2(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 978-3-95857-017-7 2 | 12
www.open-mind.net
entations)  in  the  case  of  practical  knowledge
and on conceptual capacities in the case of the-
oretical knowledge, instead of using proposition-
ality  as  the  main  criterion.  Their  account  of
what is  to be captured by a theory of know-
how, and their proposed solution, are preceded
by an illuminating discussion of the shortcom-
ings of each side of the intellectualism vs. anti-
intellectualism debate. 
2.1 Merits and shortcomings of 
intellectualism
In short, Bartels and May claim that the intel-
lectualists are right to concede that the distinc-
tion  between  knowing-how  and  knowing-that
cannot be made in terms of the propositionality
of knowing-that. Three readings of proposition-
ality are distinguished: 
• a representational  reading,  according to
which the propositionality of some men-
tal state depends on a sentence-like men-
tal representation being tokened,
• a  conscious-availability  reading,  accord-
ing  to  which  propositional  representa-
tions are consciously available and can be
expressed linguistically, and 
• a  semantic  reading  of  propositionality,
according  to  which  the  propositionality
of some mental state depends on whether
it  is  attributed as  a  propositional  atti-
tude. 
It is argued that all three readings of proposi-
tionality  are  inapt  for  making  the  distinction
between practical and theoretical knowledge. I
take it  that both the representational reading
and  the  conscious-availability  reading  are  im-
plausible  for  independent  reasons—the  repres-
entational  reading  presupposes  a  language  of
thought, while the conscious-accessibility read-
ing can arguably be undermined by considering
cases in which someone would be said to know
something  she  need  not  be  able  to  express
verbally, in terms of the proposition in question
(this  might  involve  some  non-obvious  logical
consequences of one’s occurrent beliefs). In ad-
dition, the semantic reading is what our best in-
tellectualist account of knowledge-how, namely
Stanley’s, employs, and Bartels and May follow
Stanley’s analysis here.
According to the semantic reading of pro-
positionality,  whether  some psychological  atti-
tude is propositional depends on the semantics
of the locutions used to ascribe such attitudes.
And our best current theories of the semantics
of  knows-wh  locutions—i.e.,  of  locutions  that
involve  the  verb  “know”  and  some  question
word such as “who”, “where”, “what”, “when”,
or,  to that effect,  “how”—tells  us that know-
ledge-how is propositional—just as knowledge-
that is. But as a result, it is argued, intellectual-
ists are not able to explain the respective pecu-
liarities of practical and theoretical knowledge—
both are propositional. This is identified as the
major shortcoming of intellectualism.
2.2 Merits and shortcomings of anti-
intellectualism
The anti-intellectualists, on the other hand, lack
a  systematic  criterion  for  the  distinction
between  knowledge-how  and  knowledge-that.
The  introduction  of  different  kinds  of  know-
ledge,  based  on  different  representational
formats, by some anti-intellectualists is taken to
be ad hoc (e.g., image-based knowledge and sen-
sorimotor knowledge by  Jung &  Newen 2011).
It is not based on an independently identified
set of underlying representational formats that
would explain the characteristic behavioral dif-
ferences. Instead, it merely attempts to find al-
leged mental representational formats that intu-
itively fit the distinction (cf. Bartels & May this
collection, p. 7). Further arguments to the effect
that intellectualism is a non-starter are ineffect-
ive against  Stanley’s (2011) version of intellec-
tualism (cf.  Bartels &  May this collection, pp.
10-11). An attack from Toribio (2008, reference
taken from  Bartels &  May this collection)  to
the effect that Milner & Goodale’s patient DF
(cf. Milner & Goodale 1995) could not possibly
have propositional knowledge of how to put a
card  into  a  slot  presupposes  that  knowledge-
how involves a  conceptual grasp of how some-
thing is done or of what is acted upon. Roughly,
Toribio argues that DF does not have proposi-
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tional knowledge of  how to put the card into
the slot because she cannot report on the ori-
entation of the slot. But Stanley acknowledges
that  some  propositional  attitudes  involve  the
non-conceptual grasp  of  relevant  states  of  af-
fairs. In the case of DF, this involves the non-
conceptual grasp of the orientation of the slot
(cf. Stanley 2011, p. 172).
As  a  result,  neither  intellectualists  nor
anti-intellectualists  provide  a  satisfactory  ac-
count  of  knowledge-how.  But  both  get  some
things right. The intellectualist is right in tak-
ing both knowledge-that and knowledge-how to
be propositional. And the anti-intellectualist is
right in requiring an explanation of the differ-
ence between these two kinds of knowledge, pre-
sumably in terms of underlying cognitive struc-
tures or kinds of mental representation.
2.3 Non-conceptual capacities as an 
explanation of practical knowledge
Bartels and May, then, pick up on the idea that
practical  knowledge might involve non-concep-
tual  capacities,  while  theoretical  knowledge  is
conceptual. They list a number of received pe-
culiarities of practical knowledge that are to be
captured  by  a  theory  of  practical  knowledge.
And it is proposed that these peculiarities are
the same peculiarities  that  result  from a reli-
ance on non-conceptual representations. Among
the differential  features of practical knowledge
are its being context-bound, implicit, and auto-
matic and effortless. Non-conceptual capacities,
it is argued, just have these features. The result
is a position that is intellectualist in form, be-
cause all kinds of knowledge are propositional,
but anti-intellectualist in spirit, as the distinc-
tion  of  practical  vs.  theoretical  knowledge  is
maintained. Practical knowledge is not reduced
to theoretical knowledge; rather, the former is a
non-conceptual form of knowledge while the lat-
ter is conceptual. 
One  effect  of  drawing  the  distinction
between practical and theoretical knowledge in
terms of  conceptuality is that Bartels and May
must follow Stanley in accepting non-conceptual
forms of  propositional  knowledge.  Patient  DF
cannot report on the orientation of the slot, but
nevertheless she non-conceptually grasps its ori-
entation such that she is able to put the card
into the slot. Due to her successful performance,
she is said to know how to put the card into the
slot, making this particular form of knowledge-
how  non-conceptual.  This  somewhat  departs
from tradition, where concepts are usually taken
to  be  the  constituents  of  thoughts,  while
thoughts are likely understood in a Fregean way
as the intensions of sentences, i.e., propositions.
It makes sense, though, because propositionality
is understood semantically while conceptuality
is not. Whether some cognitive capacity is con-
ceptual or non-conceptual is thought to depend
upon  the  kind  of  mental  representation  in-
volved.
3 Knowledge ascriptions and mental 
representations 
3.1 Analyzing knowledge ascriptions vs. 
explaining cognitive capacities
Now, it’s easy to believe that the whole debate
around  propositions,  concepts,  non-conceptual
representations,  and  cognitive  structure  is
highly  convoluted  and  that  it  is  difficult  to
properly disentangle the different issues that lie
behind a larger number of related debates. One
important distinction, I take it, which is not al-
ways  properly  made,  is  whether  one  is  con-
cerned with what someone does (the whole per-
son)  as  opposed to what his  or  her  cognitive
system does. What happens between Stanley’s
and Bartels  and May’s  discussion of  kinds of
knowledge, then, is a shift from a personal-level
perspective to a level at which the cognitive sys-
tem is described. 
Stanley formulates a theory of knowledge-
how on the basis of an analysis of ascriptions of
knowledge-how. And the subject of clear cases
of  appropriate  knowledge-how  ascriptions  are
persons.  Their brains (or whatever else  might
realize their cognitive systems) can at best de-
rivatively be said to know how to do something.
This is made especially clear in  Stanley’s ana-
lysis,  according  to  which  knowledge-how  in-
volves first-person thought (cf.  2011, Ch. 3). If
someone knows how to do something he knows
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that a certain way of doing something is a way
in which he could do it himself. It is hard to see
how someone’s cognitive system could have this
kind of first-person thought in a non-derivative
way.
Bartels and May, on the other hand, want
to  explain  the  particularities  of  practical  and
theoretical knowledge in terms of the involved
underlying  representations.  As  they  put  it  at
the outset of their discussion, “‘Explaining’ here
is rather to be understood as showing how the
realization of necessary conditions for the pos-
session of  concepts coincide with those condi-
tions  that  have  to  be  fulfilled  in  order  to
achieve  the  step  from practical  to  theoretical
knowledge, each characterized by their respect-
ive peculiarities. In other words, we search for
‘how-possibly-explanations’  of  the  peculiarities
of practical versus theoretical knowledge” (Bar-
tels &  May this collection).  “How-possibly-ex-
planation” is a term from mechanistic accounts
of  explanation  that  characterizes  attempted
mechanistic explanations that are not yet well
corroborated by an independent identification of
the components of the alleged mechanism. Bar-
tels and May clearly appeal to structures under-
lying cognitive abilities. In addition, they em-
ploy  a  notion  of  concepts  that  is  further  de-
veloped in Newen and Bartels (Bartels & Newen
2007), where it is made clear that concepts are
kinds  of  mental  representations  (cf.  ibid.,  p.
284). Their interest thus lies in the differences
between  the  cognitive  architectural  realization
of  practical  and theoretical  knowledge,  not  in
the ascription conditions of kinds of knowledge
to persons. And, as said, among the virtues of
Bartels and May’s paper is the clarity of the ex-
position of what is to be explained by a theory
of practical knowledge in the first place: the be-
havioral or functional peculiarities of practical
knowledge.
I  understand  that  making  a  distinction
between  different  endeavors  in  philosophy  of
mind in terms of personal vs. sub-personal level
explanations  is  not  always  a  particularly  at-
tractive way to go about the problem. The per-
sonal level brings with it  a number of  loaded
presumptions, for instance, concerning the im-
port of norms for action and belief. And I do
not want to claim that such a rich conception of
persons is involved in Stanley’s discussion. Non-
etheless it should be clear that Stanley is not
interested in what the brain does, what its func-
tional architecture is, or on which states it oper-
ates.  He  is  interested  in  knowledge-how.  And
knowledge-how is  something  someone has:  it’s
personal-level at least in the parsimonious way
that it is something we attribute to each other. 
In  realizing  that  Bartels  and  May  are
really  interested  in  the  structure  of  cognitive
systems  possessing  practical  knowledge  it  be-
comes clear why they come to a conclusion that
seems  to  be  diametrical  to  what  some  other
participants in the knowledge-how debate sug-
gest.  Bengson &  Moffett (2007),  for  instance,
argue that knowing how to do something is a
matter  of  having a guiding conception of  the
way in which the subject of knowledge-how is to
perform an activity. This captures that action
guided by knowledge-how is a form of intelligent
action—as opposed to something done by reflex,
mere habit, or rote. It is an intellectual achieve-
ment to know how to do something. Bengson &
Moffett (2007) argue that knowing how to do
something  requires  an  understanding  of  the
activity  at  hand,  and  that  understanding,  in
turn, is equivalent to the reasonable mastery of
the concept that guides the action. Understand-
ing is clearly something someone has; it is not a
trait of his or her cognitive system that might
rather be said to enable or mediate such under-
standing.
While the discussion in Bengson & Moffett
(2007)  sticks  to the vocabulary of  intellectual
appraisal employed in the Rylean treatment of
the topic, Bartels and May take a cognitive-psy-
chological  approach  to  the  matter.  For  them,
concepts  are  kinds  of  mental  representations
that  serve  to  explain  why someone  has  some
ability.  The notion of  understanding does not
figure prominently in their account. The differ-
ence to Bengson and Moffett’s account can thus
be traced back to different notions of  what a
concept is, which result from an interest in dif-
ferent perspectives on knowledge-how. Bengson
and Moffett are interested in the conditions un-
der which someone can be said to know how to
do something, while Bartels & May want to ex-
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plain  the  cognitive-psychological  difference
between  practical  and  theoretical  knowledge.
When we adopt a semantic reading of proposi-
tionality and follow Stanley’s analysis of know-
ledge-how, it becomes clear that these are very
different endeavors. A theory of knowledge-how
involves an analysis of what it is to ascribe such
knowledge to someone; it is an investigation of
the semantics of knowledge-how ascriptions and
of our ways of talking. An explanation of the
difference  between  practical  and  theoretical
knowledge, on the other hand, tells us how cor-
responding abilities are realized by the cognitive
system  in  terms  of  the  employed  representa-
tions.
One  of  the  great  virtues  of  a  semantic
reading of propositionality, then, is that it liber-
ates  us  from  drawing  conclusions  concerning
cognitive  architecture  from  the  structure  of
ascriptions of mental states to subjects. Given
that whether some mental state is propositional
depends on the form of its ascription, there is
no need to assume that the cognitive states de-
scribed as propositional have to fulfill very spe-
cific conditions as  to their  structure and con-
tent. The correctness conditions for ascriptions
of  knowledge-how need not  make reference  to
cognitive-architectural features of the subject of
the ascription. And according to Stanley’s ana-
lysis  they  don’t.  A  knowledge  state  that  is
ascribed as propositional to some subject need
not have propositional content itself nor be in
any way structured such as to provide a vehicle
for a propositional content. Indeed, Stanley (cf.
2011, p. 159) claims to have shown that having
propositional knowledge states is entirely com-
patible with even an anti-representational con-
ception of the mental. Nonetheless, knowledge-
how is taken to be behaviorally real and effica-
cious,  since it  is  implicated in  certain actions
and allows for explanations and predictions of
behavior. We will shortly see how this can be
so.
The liberation from cognitive-architectural
commitments is somewhat occluded by Stanley,
however, when he writes that he is interested in
the nature of knowledge-how and that “[d]iscus-
sions of semantics are often in fact discussions
of metaphysics, carried out in the formal mode”
(Stanley 2011, p. 144). This appears to imply
that  ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes  are
understood realistically, and this in turn seems
to be possible only if we take such ascriptions to
describe real relations among subjects and men-
tal  representations  to  have  the  propositional
content in question. This is the main motivation
for a representational theory of mind (cf. Fodor
1987). Thus, an investigation into the nature of
knowledge-how  that  comes  to  the  conclusion
that  knowledge-how  is  propositional  seems  to
employ  a  representational  reading  of  proposi-
tionality.
Fortunately,  this  strong  form  of  corres-
pondence  between  ascriptions  of  propositional
attitudes and the mental states that are thus
described  is  not  the  only  way  to  take  such
ascriptions to describe real  mental  states.  We
are not condemned to instrumentalism by ad-
opting  a  semantic  reading  of  propositionality
when we recognize that ascriptions of proposi-
tional attitudes might share their logical struc-
ture with measurement statements.
3.2 Saving realism about propositional 
attitudes while employing a semantic 
reading of propositionality: A 
measurement view
At least since the late seventies a number of re-
searchers  have  argued  that  having  a  proposi-
tional attitude is not a matter of standing in a
certain cognitive relation to an abstract object,
i.e.,  some  particular  proposition,  but  that
ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes  describe
(intrinsic) psychological states with the help of
a  domain of  abstract  representatives,  i.e.,  the
domain  of  propositions.  Propositions  play  the
same role  in  ascriptions  of  propositional  atti-
tudes  as  numbers  play in  measurement  state-
ments  (cf.  e.g.,  Churchland 1979;  Davidson
2001;  Beckermann 1996;  Matthews 2007). Let’s
call this the measurement view of propositional
attitudes. 
According  to  the  measurement  view,
ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes  have  a
non-relational  logical  form.  The  attitude  verb
and its propositional complement together form
a complex predicate that refers to an intrinsic
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psychological  property  of  the  subject  of  the
ascription. Thereby the difficulty that proposi-
tional attitudes must be understood as a rela-
tion  between  a  subject  and  a  proposition  is
avoided: they could just as well be properties of
the subject. A weaker form of the measurement
view  is  exhausted  by  this  claim  (cf.  e.g.,
Churchland 1979; Davidson 2001).
A stronger form of the measurement view
in  addition  holds  that  ascriptions  of  proposi-
tional attitudes really are measurements in the
sense that a formal measurement theory can be
formulated  for  propositional  attitudes  (Mat-
thews 2007). And indeed a further investigation
of the analogy between ordinary measurement
statements and ascriptions of propositional atti-
tudes reveals how abstract objects can be used
to refer to causally efficacious properties of ob-
jects  without  themselves  playing  any  causal
role.  A  measurement  theory  shows  that  one
formal structure, the so-called  empirical struc-
ture, can be homomorphically mapped onto an-
other  formal  structure,  the  representational
structure, the empirical structure being a formal
theory about the domain of objects of interest
(cf. e.g., Krantz 1972). The details of this map-
ping determine what can be inferred about the
empirical  structure  from  the  representational
structure. In length measurement, for instance,
ratios  between  numbers  correspond  to  ratios
between lengths of objects.
Propositional attitudes figure in the explan-
ation and prediction  of  behavior.  Thus,  in  the
case  of  propositional  attitudes,  the  empirical
formal structure has to be a formal theory of, pre-
sumably, the psychological states that are caus-
ally involved in the production of behavior. The
representational formal structure has to be an ad-
equate formalization of the structure of proposi-
tions. Leaving open what the two structures even-
tually turn out to be, it is the stronger claim that
ascriptions  of  propositional  attitudes  really  are
measurements  that  I  want  to  endorse  here.  In
particular, I take it that propositions are the ele-
ments of a representational structure of a meas-
urement theory for propositional attitudes. Let us
have a brief look at measurement theory.
In  ordinary  measurements,  numerical
scales are used to represent systems of certain
measurable properties like length or mass,  for
example. Numbers are assigned to objects in ac-
cordance to a (procedural) rule. Somewhat sim-
plified, in the case of length or mass measure-
ment, a unit element is defined, and the number
of unit elements that need to be concatenated
in a certain way such as to be of equal length or
mass, respectively, as the object that is meas-
ured, are counted. For mass the concatenation
might be a simple lumping-together in the pan
of a scale, while for length measurements unit
elements are aligned rectilinearly. The number
assigned to an object is equal to the count of
unit-elements required. These numbers can then
be  used  to  represent  relations  among  objects
that are measured in the same way, i.e., on the
same scale.  An object  that  takes  the  number
two  on  some  length  scale,  for  instance,  is
shorter  than one that is  assigned the number
three, and it takes two objects of length two to
get a concatenated object of equal length to an
object  that  was  assigned the number four  on
that  scale.  Thus,  the  system  of  objects  is
mapped with respect to their length onto the
formal  structure  constituted  by  the  natural
numbers,  including  addition  and  the  less-or-
equal  relation.  The  result  is  a  homomorphic
mapping from objects to numbers that respects
certain additive relations among the lengths of
objects. Correspondingly, the addition of num-
bers can be used to reason about the lengths of
objects.  Other properties of  these objects and
their relations might not be captured by the ho-
momorphism. Which numerical operations can
be used to reason about the objects’ properties
of interest depends on the scale that is used. In
temperature  measurement,  for  instance,  most
common  scales  do  not  respect  ratios  among
temperatures, such that it does not make sense
to say, for instance, that the air on a sunny day
at 28° centigrade is twice as warm as the air on
a day in fall at 14° centigrade. 
Importantly, the objects’ properties of in-
terest are  holistically captured by the numbers
on a scale. It is in virtue of their position on the
scale and the admissible operations that num-
bers represent certain (amounts of)  properties
of measured objects. There is nothing intrinsic
to the number five that would make it a repres-
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entative  of  a  length  of  five  centimeters  or  a
weight  of  five  kilograms.  Individually,  i.e.,
without their position on a scale, numbers don’t
tell  us  anything  about  the  property  they  are
used to represent—not even when the dimen-
sion (length, weight, …) is added. Thus, which
numbers represent which property (or amount
of  a property) and which operations on these
numbers can be used to reason about the prop-
erty of interest depends on the employed scale.
Neither are all relations among objects respec-
ted by the homomorphic mapping; nor can all
relations  among  the  numerical  representatives
be read back onto the objects of interest. This
much can be said on the basis of basic measure-
ment  theory  as  formulated  by  Krantz et  al.
(1971).
Most  interestingly  for  our  present  pur-
poses,  measurement  in  the  sense  of  homo-
morphic  mapping  does  not  require  numerical
representatives.  Elements  of  other  abstract
structures might just as well serve as the targets
of such homomorphic mappings. This idea is ex-
ploited by Matthews (2007) and Dresner (2010),
for  instance.  In  particular,  Matthews  argues
that  the  structure  of  propositions,  including
their inferential and evidential relations among
each other and to perceptions, might thus serve
as a measurement structure for certain psycho-
logical states of  subjects:  those that are com-
monly called the propositional attitudes. These
psychological  states  are  homomorphically
mapped onto propositions—the causal relations
among the former being captured by the infer-
ential,  and  other  relations  among  the  latter.
The propositions can then be used to identify
psychological states and, importantly, to reason
about  them.  Thereby,  propositional  attitudes
can appear in explanations and predictions of
behavior  without  the  propositions  themselves
having to play any causal role in the cognitive
system.
I take it that propositional structures rep-
resent psychological properties holistically—just
as numerical structures represent properties of
objects holistically. The homomorphic mapping
as a whole respects certain relations among psy-
chological states, and it is in virtue of their pos-
ition  within  the  propositional  structure  that
particular propositions can be said to represent
some  psychological  state.  According  to  this
view, there is nothing intrinsic to propositions
that would relate them to particular psycholo-
gical states. Thus, a measurement-theoretic no-
tion  of  propositionality  does  not  require  the
states that are referred to with the help of pro-
positions  to  have  propositional  content  them-
selves. Nonetheless, ascriptions of propositional
attitudes can be understood realistically just as
ordinary measurements are understood realistic-
ally. Once the mapping is fixed, it is an entirely
objective question which proposition represents
some given psychological state.
Neither  numbers  nor  propositions  are
themselves  taken to  be  causally  relevant,  but
they are used to pick out a particular causally
relevant property (or state) from a range of pos-
sible relevant properties (or states) as defined
by the scale in use. Numbers on a meter scale
are used to identify the length of objects. And
it is the length of a pole, say, that is relevant for
building a rack, not the number that is used to
identify that length. The number is only relev-
ant in relation to the numbers that are assigned
to other  parts of  the rack.  Similarly,  proposi-
tions are  used to identify  psychological  states
that are behaviorally relevant. But it is the psy-
chological states themselves that produce beha-
vior,  not  the  propositions  that  are  used  to
identify  them.  Using  propositions  to  identify
psychological  states  leaves  open  how  these
states are realized within the cognitive system.
All that is required is that the homomorphism
holds.  Indeed,  drawing  conclusions  about  the
structure of the cognitive system from observa-
tions concerning properties of the propositional
representatives of psychological states that are
not  warranted  by the  representational  scheme
(or “scale”) arguably amounts to an over-assign-
ment of structure (cf.  Dresner 2004). As noted
above, not all properties of the system of repres-
entatives  are  shared  by  what  they  represent.
The homomorphism holds with respect to some
structural features of the represented objects as
determined by the used scale.
Stanley appears to be at least sympathetic
to such a measurement-theoretic conception of
propositions—he mentions Matthews (2007) ap-
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provingly. And there is reason to believe that
such a measurement account of  ascriptions of
propositional attitudes is a plausible candidate
for a semantic conception of propositionality. As
mentioned above, it has the advantage of giving
a non-instrumentalist, realist account of propos-
itional attitudes without buying into any direct
correspondence between propositions and men-
tal  representations  that  would  lead  to  a  lan-
guage-of-thought-like theory of cognition. While
Fodorean Realism presupposes that ascriptions
of propositional attitudes can only be correct if
the involved terms refer to actual cognitive en-
tities and relations (i.e., a functional/computa-
tional relation towards a mental representation,
where the former determines the kind of atti-
tude and the latter its propositional content),
such a measurement account makes clear how a
system of  propositions could structurally (i.e.,
holistically)  represent  psychological  states
without  having  to  assume  that  psychological
states themselves have propositional content or,
at  any  rate,  are  dependent  on  how  they  are
ascribed. And it eschews some of the difficulties
associated with more traditional accounts, such
as explaining how propositions can both be the
abstract, sharable contents of thoughts and at
the same time psychologically real in that what
someone does depends on the contents of his de-
sires and beliefs, etc. (cf.  Davidson 2001). The
mental states represented by some propositional
attitude ascriptions are psychologically real; the
proposition itself  need not  be.  First  of  all,  it
serves as a representative for that state.
The difference between Stanley’s and Bar-
tels and May’s accounts of knowledge-how and
practical  knowledge,  respectively,  can  then be
understood as follows. Stanley is interested in
the structure of the domain of abstract entities
that are used to represent psychological struc-
ture,  while  Bartels and May are interested in
the structure of the empirical domain of psycho-
logical entities and relations that are described
in  terms  of  propositional  attitudes.  Both  en-
deavors are related in that they involve a phe-
nomenon that we might call “knowing how to
do something”, and both use intuitive examples
and empirical evidence as test cases for their ac-
counts. But their respective goal is really quite
different.  In  analogy  to  the  measurement  of
length, one might say that Bartels and May are
interested  in  giving  a  theory of  how different
bodies behave with respect to their length un-
der some range of (physical) concatenation op-
erations and comparison relations. For instance,
welding two rods might have an influence on the
resultant length of the composite rod such that
it is not equally long as the two aligned but un-
welded rods.  Or,  they might  be  interested  in
how  length  measurement  transfers  to  smaller
scales, such as molecular, atomic, or subatomic
distances. Stanley, on the other hand, would be
interested in the more formal properties of the
numerical scales that are used for length meas-
urement. He might ask how different scales re-
late. Just as the Fahrenheit scale can be trans-
ferred into the centigrade scale, knows-wh locu-
tions might be transformed into know-that locu-
tions.
Toribio’s above-mentioned attack on intel-
lectualism would then not be successful, because
she has not realized that Stanley’s theory really
is about the structure of the representatives of
certain psychological states, and not about the
psychological states themselves. She offers some
considerations  concerning  the  structure of  the
psychological  states  that  are  meant  to  show
that they could not possibly be propositional.
But she does not give us a reason to think that
the  considered  properties  of  certain  cognitive
processes face difficulties in terms of being rep-
resented  by a  propositional  structure.  Stanley
then shows that there is no such difficulty. Tori-
bio’s discussion, on the other hand, is rather in-
teresting for the development of an account of
the cognitive structures that make it the case
that someone knows how to do something.
Stanley’s and Bartels and May’s accounts
are thus relatively  independent of  each other.
Stanley’s theory of knowledge-how can be seen
as a partial investigation of the representational
structure that we use to identify certain mental
states. The approach of Bartels and May, on the
other hand, is an attempt to give an explana-
tion  of  certain  cognitive  capacities  that  are
taken  to  be  expressions  of  knowledge-how  in
terms  of  underlying  mental  representations.
Given  that  propositional  attitude  ascriptions
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measure psychological states, they aim to for-
mulate a theory of the empirical structure. The
measurement view first  of  all  serves to disen-
tangle  these  different  endeavors  and  to  shed
some  light  on  the  relation  between  them,
namely that the search for underlying represent-
ations and mental mechanisms is largely uncon-
strained by the structure of ascriptions of pro-
positional attitudes by themselves and that con-
clusions about the empirical structure can only
be drawn when the mapping is known as well. 
This  take  is  in  line  with  both  Stanley’s
theory  and  Bartels  and  May’s  explanation  of
practical knowledge. Stanley believes that cog-
nitive  psychology  does  not  decide  whether
knowledge-how is propositional and refutes all
objections to the contrary. The propositionality
of knowledge-how is a matter of the semantics
of their ascriptions. And Bartels and May give a
characterization of the difference between prac-
tical  and  theoretical  knowledge  that  is  inde-
pendent of Stanley’s theory of knowledge-how.
Practical knowledge has some behavioral/func-
tional characteristics that are to be explained in
terms of mental representations. The measure-
ment view parts company with Stanley in his
contention  that  he  provides  an  investigation
into the  nature of knowledge-how. Rather, the
measurement  view  is  an  investigation  into  a
part of the representational structure of a meas-
urement theory for a certain range of psycholo-
gical states. We would not take an investigation
of the centigrade scale to be an investigation of
the nature of temperature.
4 Some final remarks
What  the  discussion  around  knowledge-how
mainly  shows,  I  think,  is  that  the  relation
between propositional attitudes, cognitive struc-
tures  or  representations,  and  the  behavioral
evidence for their  respective presence are still
not well  understood. It  seems that we find it
surprisingly difficult to disentangle our different
ways of talking about ourselves and others in
terms of what we believe, on the one hand, and
in terms of the information that our brains (or
some other  division  of  the body-environment)
process on the other. The main difficulty seems
to be that we take ascriptions of propositional
attitudes to mirror psychologically real relations
between subjects and propositions. As such, we
feel the need to tell a story about how proposi-
tional attitudes are realized in the brain. The
measurement view enables us to employ a less
committal  way of  representing  someone’s  psy-
chological  states  that largely leaves open how
the cognitive system manages to coordinate its
behavior with the environment. The constraints
that are put on cognitive architecture by suc-
cessful ascriptions of propositional attitudes are
really quite weak. To be sure, if the measure-
ment view is to be proven correct, there must
be a homomorphic mapping from an empirical
structure into the propositional structure. But
homomorphisms abound. Any number of homo-
morphisms can be found between any two struc-
tures. And as far as we can tell, the structure of
propositions  is  homomorphic  to  the  course  of
the sun and the stars. This is why we can em-
ploy intentional explanations for just about any
system  we  want.  The  measurement  view  be-
comes informative when we have formalizations
of the two structures and a measurement theory
that describes the particular homomorphism of
interest that holds between them. Then we can
tell what we learn about the empirical structure
by means of reasoning about propositions. An
attempt  to  infer  the  empirical  structure  from
the representational structure alone must fail.
In the case of propositional attitudes, I ul-
timately doubt that the mapping is best con-
ceived as holding between internal cognitive ar-
chitectural structure and propositional attitude
ascriptions. Propositional attitudes might rather
be measurements of structures of observable be-
havior. Propositional attitudes are ascribed on
the basis of observable behavior together with
some standards of folk psychology—such as that
one believes what one sees or what one is told
by  trustworthy  peers.  Propositions  might
provide standardized ways of identifying behavi-
orally  relevant  circumstances,  including  what
someone  saw,  was  told,  and  aims  for,  that
would otherwise have to be identified less sys-
tematically by way of particular situations and
individual  histories.  I  can  tell  that  you know
that the earth is an approximate sphere—you’ve
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certainly learned it somewhere. I do not need to
go back in your learning history until I find the
moment in  which someone uttered a sentence
with the respective meaning—which would al-
low for similar predictions and explanations.
Taking propositional  attitude  ascriptions
to be measurements of structures of observable
behavior would also be very much in line with
Ryle’s original, rather behaviorist discussion of
knowledge-how.  With  reference  to  our  use  of
mental vocabulary to describe the behavior of
others,  Ryle writes that “we go beyond what
we see them do and hear them say, but this go-
ing beyond is not a going behind, in the sense
of making inferences to occult causes; it is go-
ing beyond in the sense of considering, in the
first  instance,  the  powers and propensities  of
which their actions are exercises” (1949, p.51).
The powers and propensities are in turn under-
stood  as  complex  dispositions,  describable  in
terms  of  their  acquisition  and  manifestation
conditions. The move from a structure of ob-
servable behavior to a propositional structure
would take the place of acknowledging the role
of so-called internal states; for now we can ex-
ploit  inferential  relations  among  propositions
for explanation and prediction. But these pro-
positional attitudes need not be understood as
internal states. Instead they could be taken as
measurement representations of  Ryle’s powers
and  propensities.  Ryle  notwithstanding,  how-
ever, we need not give up cognitive psychology.
Ascriptions of propositional attitudes and cog-
nitive representations would relate via the be-
havior  that  each  is  to  explain—they  provide
complementary explanations of the same beha-
vior.  For  Bartels  and  May’s  explanation  of
practical knowledge this would mean that it is
not part of a theory of an empirical structure
for measurements of propositional attitudes. It
would be a cognitive-psychological explanation
of  a  behaviorally  characterized  psychological
phenomenon  called  practical  knowledge.  The
main  point  of  this  commentary,  though—
namely, that Stanley and Bartels and May are
up to different things and that little can be in-
ferred about cognitive architecture from Stan-
ley’s  analysis  of  knowledge-how—remains  un-
touched.
In closing, I want to mention one reserva-
tion that can be held against the particular cog-
nitive-architectural  account  presented  by  Bar-
tels  and  May.  Given  that  concepts  remain  a
vexed  issue  in  contemporary  discussion,  that
they are traditionally closely related to proposi-
tions, and that it is notoriously difficult to find
good grounds for attributing representations of
a certain kind and with a specific  content to
cognitive systems that are not able to verbally
express their beliefs, a semantic reading of con-
ceptuality might be worth considering. Concepts
might be broadly conceived of as the constitu-
ents of  thoughts,  i.e.,  (trains) of propositional
attitudes. In our case: whatever is a constituent
of  knowledge-how  would  count  as  a  concept.
One effect of this would be that the reliance on
non-conceptual  capacities  in  order  to  explain
certain forms of knowledge-how, like that of pa-
tient DF, would not be open to Stanley. But as
an  alternative,  Stanley  could  accept  demon-
strative concepts and claim that some forms of
knowledge-how  are  distinguished  by  their  in-
volvement.  Admittedly,  Bartels  & May would
have to change their terminology; their abilities
approach  to  concepts  is  not  compatible  with
concepts being the constituents of propositions
alongside a semantic reading of propositionality.
But  nothing  much  seems  to  be  lost  by  this.
Quite  possibly,  mentalistic  vocabulary  is  just
not  the  best  way  to  come  to  grips  with  the
structure of cognitive systems.
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